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Note
Economic Protectionism and Occupational
Licensing Reform
Gerald S. Kerska*
Consider the case of Tasos Kariofyllis and Steve Barraco—
two entrepreneurs who started a successful teeth whitening
1
business in Connecticut. The company, aptly named Sensational Smiles, sold over-the-counter whitening products in a
mall. Sensational Smiles had comfortable seating for customers, and its employees helped purchasers enhance their new
2
whitening products through the application of LED lights.
3
Both the products sold and the services provided were safe.
The Connecticut State Board of Dental Examiners, composed of
practicing dentists and therefore the direct competitors of businesses like Sensational Smiles, decided that teeth whitening is
4
a form of dentistry. The Board sent Kariofyllis and Barraco a
5
cease and desist letter. Unwilling to risk criminal prosecution
or to attend dental school, the entrepreneurs closed Sensational
6
Smiles. Kariofyllis and Barraco brought suit in federal court,
alleging a deprivation of their due process rights to engage in a

* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you
to Professors Dale Carpenter and Heidi Kitrosser for their guidance in writing
this Note. Many thanks to the Minnesota Law Review members who suffered
through the editing process. Any remaining errors are undoubtedly my own.
Copyright © 2017 by Gerald S. Kerska.
1. Connecticut Teeth Whitening, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/case/ct
-teeth-whitening (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id. (“There is no health or safety reason to make it illegal for anyone
other than a dentist to offer teeth-whitening services.”).
4. See CONN. STATE DENTAL COMM’N, DECLARATORY RULING: TEETH
WHITENING (2011), http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/phho/dental_commission/
declaratory_rulings/2011_teeth_whitening_declaratory_ruling_-_corrected.pdf.
5. Connecticut Teeth Whitening, supra note 1.
6. Id.
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lawful profession and a denial of equal protection under the
7
law. To what result?
Under the Supreme Court’s post-Lochner economic liber8
ties cases, almost-certain victory awaited the government. Indeed, the Court said as much in Ferguson v. Skrupa, noting
that “relief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the body
9
constituted to pass laws for the [state].” The district court
10
granted summary judgment in favor of Connecticut, and the
11
Second Circuit affirmed on appeal. Although Sensational
Smiles lost their suit, litigants across the country have persuaded federal district courts to strike down a number of occu12
pational licensing laws, and these surprising cases have led to
13
a circuit split.
The disagreement between the circuits centers on the type
of interests that may justify government action, like occupa-

7. Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149, 152 (D. Conn. 2014), aff’d sub
nom. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016).
8. For many years, Lochner served as popinjay for critics of the “activist”
Supreme Court in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal,
Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L.
REV. 209, 280 n.169 (1998) (“The ghost of Lochner has haunted the Court ever
since, with justices invoking the case to accuse their opponents of unjustified
judicial activism.”). The Court at that time protected economic liberties by
applying rather searching scrutiny to laws interfering with the now-disfavored
freedom of contract. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated
by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding a law limiting
work hours to be unconstitutional restriction on the right to freedom of contract). But Lochner is not without its defenders. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein,
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental
Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) (suggesting that the academy
should reassess Lochner-style jurisprudence).
9. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963).
10. Martinez, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (granting Connecticut’s motion for
summary judgment).
11. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 283 (affirming on appeal).
12. See, e.g., Brantley v. Kuntz, 98 F. Supp. 3d 884 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (invalidating a requirement that African hair braiders become licensed cosmetologists); Waugh v. Nev. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 36 F. Supp. 3d 991, 997 (D.
Nev. 2014) (striking down a requirement for those who teach makeup artistry
to be cosmetologists); Bruner v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693 (E.D. Ky.
2014) (striking down a competitor’s veto law for moving trucks); Clayton v.
Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (D. Utah 2012) (invalidating another
African hair-braiding statute); Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (same).
13. See infra Part I.C (discussing the current circuit split on the validity
of economic protectionism as a legitimate government interest).
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tional licensing laws. In these cases, states have defended occupational licensing laws by arguing that such regulations may
be justified out of pure economic protectionism—i.e., favoring
one set of favored constituents over others, even if the public
does not benefit from the law.
The Second and Tenth Circuits have explicitly held that
laws may be passed out of economic protectionism, while the
14
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth disagree. Not only did those three circuits reject economic protectionism as a basis for government
action, they also struck down occupational licensing laws under
15
the rational basis standard. This result is surprising considering that the Supreme Court abandoned economic substantive
due process in 1937 and has not since invalidated a single piece
16
of economic legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This raises a series of interesting questions. Does Supreme
Court precedent justify striking down laws after a showing of
economic protectionism? And if not, should courts extend
heightened scrutiny to occupational licensing laws motivated
by such a purpose?
This Note seeks to answer those questions. Part I introduces background materials on occupational licensing, equal protection and due process jurisprudence, and the circuit split over
economic protectionism. Part II of this Note breaks with a
growing body of scholarship by arguing that even if the economic protectionism principle is constitutionally illegitimate, Supreme Court precedent does not support the invalidation of licensing statutes. Part III argues that heightened judicial scrutiny should not be extended to create a strong anti-economic
protectionism principle for three reasons. First, courts lack the
institutional capacity to determine when a licensing law exhibits this illegitimate motive. Second, an aggressive antieconomic protectionism principle would call into question much
state and federal legislation, leaving courts with the heady task
of rooting out special interest influence. Third, by denying litigants relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts promote
efficiency by routing challenges into other legal areas—namely
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. See infra note 24 and accompanying text (collecting studies which
show that occupational licensing laws provide little in the way of consumer
benefits).
16. See Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due
Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 265, 266 (stating that the Supreme Court abandoned economic substantive due process in 1937).
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state constitutional and administrative law and federal antitrust law. Finally, Part IV contends that Congress is the appropriate branch of government to remedy restrictive licensing
laws and sets forth a grant program that could supply this
remedy.
I. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM
This Part begins by laying groundwork for a discussion of
the role an anti-economic protectionism principle would play
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section A provides context about occupational licensing
laws and the trouble they cause the American economy. Section
B supplies the Fourteenth Amendment principles that would
govern a challenge to an occupational licensing law. Finally,
the last Section introduces the circuit split over economic protectionism in the federal courts of appeal. Together, these three
Sections will provide the context for evaluating whether Supreme Court precedent justifies striking down occupational licensing laws that are motivated by economic protectionism.
A. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
An occupational license is a government-issued credential
17
that enables a person to engage in a profession. In theory, federal, state, and local governments use this regulatory tool to
18
protect consumers. To be sure, many occupational licenses do
protect the public. Consider, for instance, the licensing requirements imposed on doctors and airline pilots. But the benefits of many licensing laws are not so clear. Why should hair
shampooers, interior decorators, and horse teeth floaters need
19
permission from the government to earn a living?

17. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICYMAKERS 6 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE
REPORT].
18. Id. at 3.
19. See, e.g., Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding an
onerous requirement on interior designers); Shampoo Technician, TENN. DEP’T
COM. & INS., https://www.tn.gov/commerce/article/cosmo-shampoo-technician
(last visited Mar. 17, 2017) (requiring anyone who “brushes, combs, shampoos,
rinses and conditions upon the hair and scalp” to undertake “not less than 300
hours in the practice and theory of shampooing at a school of cosmetology”);
Texas Equine Dentistry, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/case/mitz-v-texas-state
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Occupational licensing is prevalent across the country.
Over the past half-century, the percentage of professions licensed in the United States increased sharply from about five
20
percent in the 1950s to around thirty percent today. This rise
is at least partially explained by an increasingly serviceoriented American economy and an American workforce belong21
ing to fewer labor unions. Without question, licensure is good
for those in the licensed profession, “rais[ing] their wages by as
much as 15 percent and enhanc[ing] other benefits such as
22
health coverage and pensions.” That said, overly restrictive
licensing laws are not good for the economy.
A recent study—endorsed by the Obama Administration—
concluded that over-licensure adds nearly three million people
to the unemployment rolls, while costing American consumers
23
about $300 billion per year in excess prices. But there is little
evidence to suggest that consumers receive anything in re24
turn. Economists refer to this type of situation as rentseeking, a practice by which a group of professionals join together to lobby legislators to raise their occupation’s entry re25
quirements. Heightened barriers to entry restrict competition,
which allows professionals to raise their rates, free from the
26
inconveniences of an open market.
To make matters worse, the negative effects of occupational licensing often form an insurmountable hurdle for entrepreneurs and for disadvantaged workers. As many as thirty-five
percent of military spouses practice licensed professions, which
-board-of-veterinary-medical-examiners (last visited Mar. 17, 2017) (describing
the practice of horse tooth floating, which involves the filing of horse teeth).
20. Douglas Clement, The Rise of Occupational Licensing, FED. RES. BANK
MINNEAPOLIS (June 1, 2008), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the
-region/the-rise-of-occupational-licensing.
21. Id.
22. Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies 6
(Brookings Inst.: Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2015-01, 2015), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/THP_KleinerDiscPaper_
final.pdf.
23. Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing: Protecting the Public Interest or Protectionism? 3 (Upjohn Inst. Emp. Res., Policy Paper No. 2011-009,
2011), http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=
up_policypapers.
24. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 58 (collecting studies).
25. See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution,
64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 194 (2012) (discussing “the costs of lobbyist-driven rentseeking on the national economy”).
26. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 14.
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means they need additional training or to pay additional fees
27
every time their family moves across state lines. Immigrants
also struggle to meet the licensing requirements for jobs for
28
which they are otherwise qualified. Furthermore, in many
states, a person with a past criminal conviction may be denied
29
a license. There may also be some evidence that occupational
30
licensing laws disproportionately harm minority workers. It is
then no surprise that states with the most onerous licensing
laws have significantly lower rates of entrepreneurship by low31
income citizens.
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO LEGISLATION
The Supreme Court uses a tiered framework for evaluating
challenges brought under the Due Process and Equal Protec32
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts apply
heightened scrutiny to laws impinging on a fundamental right
33
or drawing a classification that includes a suspect group.
Fundamental rights include marital privacy, parental childrearing decisions, a woman’s right to an abortion, and mar34
riage. Suspect classifications are most commonly thought of as

27. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id.
30. See Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get There from Here?: How the Law
Still Threatens King’s Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1, 6–16 (2004) (detailing how
occupational licensing laws hurt minority communities).
31. STEPHEN SLIVINSKI, BOOTSTRAPS TANGLED IN RED TAPE: HOW STATE
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING HINDERS LOW-INCOME ENTREPRENEURSHIP 6 tbl.4
(2015).
32. The multi-tiered framework is often attributed to the most famous
footnote in all of constitutional law, footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond
Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 751 (2014) (“Rather than
being based in Brown or any of the seminal race cases, the most prominent
doctrinal features of contemporary equal protection jurisprudence—suspect
classification analysis and the tiers of scrutiny—trace their intellectual heritage back to a law-clerk-drafted footnote in a six-page decision about filled
milk.”).
33. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (rational basis scrutiny
applies when “a classification neither involv[es] fundamental rights nor proceed[s] along suspect lines”).
34. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (defining a fundamental right to marital privacy); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (defining a fundamental right of parents to make child-reading decisions); Myers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
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35

those involving race and gender. When heightened scrutiny
36
applies, it often results in courts striking down state action.
All other challenges, including those to occupational licensing
laws, receive rational basis scrutiny, which almost always re37
sults in a victory for the government.
Rational basis review is not demanding. The Supreme
38
Court describes it as a “paradigm of judicial restraint.” In reviewing legislation under this standard, a court first asks
whether the government is pursuing a permissible objective,
then whether the governmental action bears any rational rela39
tionship to achieving that objective. At both steps of the inquiry, the challenged action comes cloaked in a strong presumption of constitutionality.
Unlike the federal government, which has only enumerated powers, state governments possess the general police power,
permitting them to act in the promotion of public health, safety,
40
or welfare. Courts do not inquire into the motivation behind a
particular action, and nearly any piece of legislation can be de41
scribed as benefitting the public in some way. As a result, it is
42
the rare case where improper purpose leads to invalidation.
35. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(listing race, alienage, national origin, and sex as classes receiving heightened
scrutiny).
36. Professor Gerald Gunther famously referred to strict scrutiny as
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts,
59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (“Thirty percent of all applications of strict
scrutiny—nearly one in three—result in the challenged law being upheld.”).
37. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply
because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality.’” (quoting Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911))).
38. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).
39. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“First, are
they directed at the achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose? Second, do they rationally further that purpose?”).
40. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314.
41. Id.
42. See id.; cf. Clark Neily, One Test, Two Standards: The On-and-Off
Role of “Plausibility” in Rational Basis Review, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199,
208 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held the legislature’s actual
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The rational connection between the challenged action and
real or hypothesized governmental objective is easy to satisfy.
The government need not prove that the legislation actually
works, and the government’s decision is not “subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation un43
supported by evidence or empirical data.” Nor must the government solve an entire problem at once. Under rational basis
review, partial solutions suffice and legislatures may leave the
44
rest of the issue for another day.
It is nearly impossible for litigants to prevail under the
traditional rational basis standard. To do so, one must show
45
that every possible justification for the challenged action fails.
And if proving a negative is not hard enough, courts help the
government by proposing reasons for upholding challenged ac46
tions.
The Supreme Court’s rational basis jurisprudence is not
always so deferential. On four occasions, the Court has invalidated laws motivated by “a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group” under the rational basis stand47
ard. Scholars call this more demanding form of review “ra48
tional basis with bite.” Although a majority of the Supreme
Court has never formally recognized that such a second rational basis standard exists, individual Justices and commentators
49
have done so repeatedly. Because economic protectionism

intent in passing the challenged law is irrelevant under the rational basis
test.”).
43. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315.
44. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 485–87
(1955).
45. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (stating that a litigant
must negate every possible justification for the legislation).
46. See Aaron Belzer, Putting the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review,
41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 339 (2014) (describing the use of hypothetical justifications to survive judicial review).
47. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 582–84 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 633 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435
(1985).
48. See, e.g., Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987) (referring to this more aggressive
form of review as “rational basis with bite”).
49. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747,
759–63 (2011) (describing the rational basis with bite doctrine).
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might be a form of impermissible animus, a brief but deeper
dive into these cases is necessary.
Rational basis with bite first appeared in 1973 with the
50
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno. There the
Court struck down food stamp requirements because legislative
history revealed that animus against hippies motivated the
51
law. Twelve years later, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance after determining that a city denied a permit to a home
52
for cognitively disabled persons out of irrational prejudice.
Next, rational basis with bite continued to appear in a trilogy of
gay rights decisions. First, in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck
down a Colorado constitutional amendment that stripped legal
53
protections from homosexuals. Second, Justice O’Connor
wrote separately in Lawrence v. Texas, arguing that an antisodomy law was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause be54
cause it exhibited animus. Finally, the Court in United States
v. Windsor relied on rational basis with bite to invalidate the
55
Defense of Marriage Act.
These five cases provide the best evidence that a rational
basis with bite standard exists. In each, the government should
have prevailed, but ultimately failed to do so under rational
56
basis review. Whether it was saving financial resources by
increasing restrictions on the availability of food stamps in
Moreno or keeping a home for the disabled off of a flood plain in
Cleburne, each case presented a possible—albeit flimsy—
57
justification for the challenged law. If such a standard of review exists, then how does it work?
In the few cases thus far, triggering the rational basis with
bite standard requires a showing that government officials act-

50. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35 (stating that animus “against hippies
cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify” the law (alteration in original) (quoting
Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972))).
51. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
52. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
54. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
55. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
56. Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus,
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 192 (2014) (describing the rationales that could have
justified the challenged laws).
57. Id. at 207.
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ed out of animus or a “bare . . . desire to harm.” This type of
purpose scrutiny is common in Fourteenth Amendment juris59
prudence. Indeed, facially neutral laws are subject to strict or
intermediate scrutiny only after a showing that state actors
60
targeted a suspect group. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court laid out
factors for determining legislative motive: whether a law has a
disparate impact on a class of persons, whether the government
departed from its normal procedural processes or substantive
considerations, the legislative or administrative history, and
“[t]he historical background of the decision . . . particularly if it
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purpos61
es.” These factors all relate to the process through which legislators pass laws, making them the best indicia of legislative
intent. The Supreme Court, in turn, used these factors to determine whether government action was motivated by ani62
mus.
Although the Supreme Court has firmly established that
laws cannot be motivated by animus, the Court has not clearly
defined exactly how the rational basis with bite standard applies. The cases thus far indicate that after a litigant shows animus to have been the primary motivation of state action,
heightened judicial scrutiny will apply but the precise nature of
that scrutiny remains undefined. The Court in Cleburne suggested, in dicta, that the government might still prevail after a
showing of animus, but that flimsy or hypothetical justifica63
tions are no longer sufficient. Instead, courts should search for
the actual reasons that motivated the challenged state action

58. Yoshino, supra note 49, at 760.
59. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional
Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court’s purpose
scrutiny in constitutional law cases).
60. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (“[T]he basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”).
61. 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977). See generally Robert C. Farrell, Legislative
Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1992)
(compiling the methods used by the Supreme Court to analyze legislative purpose). Statutory statements of purpose have also been used to determine legislative purpose. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 465
(1981) (examining the articulated statutory purposes).
62. See Carpenter, supra note 56, at 246–48 (describing the Supreme
Court’s animus methodology).
63. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
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64

and determine if they are legitimate. In other words, the cloak
of presumed constitutionality is removed. The government
must show that the law rationally serves a legitimate, nonanimus-based objective. Whether these same principles apply
to laws motivated by economic protectionism is a question for a
later Section.
C. CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE OVER WHETHER ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM SERVES A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST
Recall that when courts examine state action under the rational basis standard, they ask whether the action serves a valid government purpose. A question divides the courts of appeal:
is economic protectionism—that is, favoring one group of citizens against competition—such a valid purpose? Two circuits
have held economic protectionism is legitimate; three others
disagree.
The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all hold economic protectionism to be an illegitimate interest. In the first of those
decisions, the Sixth Circuit struck down a licensing statute that
65
limited casket sales to funeral home directors. In reaching
that conclusion, the court cited cases involving the Contracts
and Dormant Commerce Clauses, stating “[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete interest group from
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental pur66
pose.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that providing a
benefit to special interests is not a valid exercise of the police
67
power. The term “police power” refers to the authority of a
68
state to enact legislation. Later the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
69
would cite this line of reasoning with approval. All three of
these decisions are similar in one other way: after rejecting

64. See Farrell, supra note 61, at 24–25 (referring to Cleburne and Moreno
as searching for the government’s “actual purpose”).
65. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
66. Id. at 224.
67. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
412 (1983).
68. For an early Supreme Court discussion of the police power, see New
Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. Louisiana Light & Heat Producing & Manufacturing.
Co., 115 U.S. 650, 660 (1885).
69. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154, 161 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Notably, we approve[ ] of the Craigmiles court’s reasoning . . . .”); Merrifield v.
Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e agree with the Sixth
Circuit in Craigmiles and reject the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning . . . .”).
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economic protectionism as a legitimate government interest,
they all struck down regulations under the “traditional rational
70
basis review.”
On the other side of the ledger, both the Tenth and Second
Circuits have held that economic protectionism is a legitimate
71
state interest. In Powers v. Harris, the Tenth Circuit began by
72
distinguishing the cases cited by the Sixth Circuit. The court
noted that different state interests may survive judicial review
73
depending on the clause of the Constitution at issue. Thus,
while economic protectionism may not pass muster under the
dormant Commerce Clause, it might do so under the Equal
Protection Clause. To support this conclusion, the court cited a
whole string of Fourteenth Amendment cases—including those
involving occupational licensing—where the Supreme Court
upheld protectionist regulations based on the recognition of reliance interests or simply to “[free a] profession, to as great an
74
extent as possible, from all taints of commercialism.” In Sensational Smiles v. Mullen, the Second Circuit agreed that eco75
nomic protectionism is a legitimate interest. Striking down
regulations motivated by rent-seeking, according to the court,
would be “destructive to federalism and to the power of the sov76
ereign states to regulate their internal economic affairs.” After
accepting economic protectionism as a legitimate interest, both
of these courts went on to uphold the challenged regulations
77
under the rational basis standard.

70. St. Joseph, 712 F.3d at 227; Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 992; Craigmiles,
312 F.3d at 229.
71. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir.
2004).
72. Powers, 379 F.3d 1219–21.
73. Id. at 1220.
74. Id. at 1221 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 491 (1955)); see also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S.
103 (2003); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
75. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 286 (“We join the Tenth Circuit and
conclude that economic favoritism is rational for purposes of our review of
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
76. Id. at 287.
77. Id. at 288; Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225.
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II. WHY EXISTING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IS
INADEQUATE FOR REMEDYING LICENSING LAWS
MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM
As the last Part discussed, the courts of appeal are divided
on whether economic protectionism is a legitimate government
interest. Several circuits, rejecting such an interest, have
struck down occupational licensing regulations under the tradi78
tional rational basis standard. A large body of scholarship already asks whether economic protectionism is a legitimate gov79
ernment interest. Stepping back from the legitimacy question,
assume instead that economic protectionism is an illegitimate
government interest and may not serve as a justification for
state action. This nevertheless leaves open a question: How can
or should courts enforce an anti-economic protectionism principle? The answer to this question largely determines whether
the Equal Protection Clause serves as a proper vehicle for occupational licensing reform.
This Part assumes that economic protectionism cannot justify state action and proceeds by examining two possible roles
that an anti-economic protectionism principle could play in
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. A weak version of such
a principle would consist of applying rational basis review,
while rejecting any attempt by state actors to justify their
choices out of protectionism. In other words, passing rational
basis muster requires that a law serve some non-protectionist
justification. A strong principle, however, would treat economic
protectionism as a constitutionally forbidden motivation, much
like animus, and would trigger rational basis with bite.
This Part analyzes these possibilities under Supreme
Court precedent. Ultimately, the weak version is irrelevant;
rational basis review is so deferential that any occupational

78. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223–28 (5th Cir. 2013);
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 990–92 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v.
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225–29 (6th Cir. 2002).
79. For commentators arguing in favor of increased judicial scrutiny of
occupational licenses, see, for example, Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequences
for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135 (2011) (arguing against protectionist occupational licensing); Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with Economic
Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1055, 1085–96 (2014); Timothy Sandefur, The
Right To Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207 (2003) (arguing for heightened
protection of economic liberties).
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licensing law should pass muster. Yet the strong version, treating economic protectionism like animus, is not supported by the
principles underlying rational basis with bite. As a result, an
anti-economic protectionism principle should not, under current Fourteenth Amendment precedent, provide a basis for
striking down overly restrictive licensing regimes.
A. ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM AS AN ILLEGITIMATE END UNDER
TRADITIONAL RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
An anti-economic protectionism principle could serve a
weak role in constitutional jurisprudence where courts continue
to apply rational basis review to licensing challenges but do not
allow state actors to justify legislation with respect to that interest. In essence, courts would demand that state actors provide a legitimate public health, safety, or welfare goal for chal80
lenged action. This weak version of the principle is what the
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits purported to use in striking
81
down occupational licensing laws. The problem with this ap82
proach lies with the rational basis standard itself.
Taking protectionism off the table does little for those
harmed by occupational licensing because the government will
prevail if it can come up with any justification for its actions—
83
real or hypothetical. Making matters worse, there are several
hypothetical rationales that will always apply to licensing laws.
Many forms of onerous occupational licensing may be justified as a recognition of reliance interests. The Supreme Court
has twice blessed this line of reasoning. In City of New Orleans
v. Dukes, the Court found the recognition of established push
cart vendors’ contributions to the French Quarter sufficient to

80. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
81. This is precisely what the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits claimed to
do. See St. Joseph, 712 F.3d at 227 (claiming to apply rational basis review
and expressly denying that the court was reviving Lochner); Merrifield, 547
F.3d at 992 (claiming to apply rational basis review in striking down a statutory scheme that exempted some pest control operators from licensing but not
others); Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228 (claiming to apply rational basis review
and expressly denying that the court was reviving Lochner).
82. Critics of deferential rational basis review mock the standard by referring to it as the “rationalize-a-basis-test.” See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Rational Basis Scrutiny Is Just a Stupid Rock, CATO UNBOUND (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/02/18/timothy-sandefur/rational-basis
-scrutiny-just-stupid-rock (crediting Clark Neily with coining the phrase).
83. See sources cited supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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84

uphold a grandfather clause. The Court applied the same reasoning in Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa by
upholding a steep tax differential between slot machines on
riverboats and at racetracks because the boats were heavily
85
invested in the Mississippi communities.
This same line of reasoning can be applied to occupational
licensing laws. The protection of reliance interests rationale
commonly arises when an existing profession seeks to expand
86
the scope of activities covered under its definition. For exam87
ple, dentists may wish to define teeth whitening as dentistry,
doctors may seek to constrict the procedures conducted by
88
nurse practitioners, and cosmetologists may wish to stop unli89
censed hair braiders. At first blush, it might seem preposterous to require teeth whiteners to be dentists. But as Judge
Calabresi recently noted, there are several ways in which these
90
regulations meet the minimal rationality standard. Increasing
the cost of one type of service, say teeth whitening, might sub91
sidize the cost of other dental procedures. But at a more basic
level, if a legislature wants citizens to undergo arduous training for a profession—assuming that the licensure of that underlying profession is rational—then any expansion of the profes-

84. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976) (explaining
that “newer businesses were less likely to have built up substantial reliance
interests” and that the older businesses “had themselves become part of the
distinctive character and charm that distinguishes the Vieux Carre”).
85. 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003) (“[L]egislators may have wanted to encourage
the economic development of river communities or to promote riverboat history, say, by providing incentives for riverboats to remain in the State . . . .”).
86. Many of the successful challenges described in the Introduction arise
when one profession (usually cosmetologists) lobby legislators to impose new
or additional licensing requirements on their hair-braiding competitors. See
cases cited supra note 12.
87. See, e.g., Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 283–85 (2d
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016) (describing how a state dental
board changed the definition of dentistry).
88. See generally Benjamin J. McMichael, Occupational Licensing and
Legal Liability: The Effect of Regulation and Litigation on Nurse Practitioners,
Physician Assistants, and the Healthcare System (May 2015) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University), https://law.vanderbilt.edu/phd/
students/files/McMichael.pdf (describing how lobbying efforts by doctors affect
the range of activities that nurse practitioners may undertake).
89. See cases cited supra note 12.
90. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 287–88.
91. Id.
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92

sion’s scope should also be rational. Forcing a discrete group
of citizens to bear the brunt of subsidizing a profession may be
93
unjust, but the Supreme Court has found it to be permissible.
There are several other broad rationales, aside from recognizing reliance interests, that will almost always provide a justification for occupational licensing laws. First, state boards of
94
examiners supervise many licensed occupations. Often these
boards investigate consumer complaints and may levy discipli95
nary sanctions. In this way licensing laws may provide some
96
degree of consumer protection. Second, states may try to combat potential problems created by asymmetrical information in
97
the marketplace. With some professions, consumers may lack
sufficient information about the quality of a firm’s services,
which creates the possibility that unrestrained competition
98
may lead to a race to the bottom. Finally, a state might believe that the training required for licensure provides value to
consumers, even if it is not strictly necessary. For example, the
Supreme Court upheld a regulation that required adjusters to
hold law degrees because customers might have legal ques99
tions. The Court even declined to confront the appellee’s ar100
gument that debt adjusting requires no legal knowledge. Just
92. This follows as a matter of basic logic. If, as is commonly accepted,
barriers to entry raise salaries, then restrictive licensing laws act as a form of
subsidy for the licensed profession. See supra Part I.A (describing the economic effects of licensing laws).
93. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732–33 (1963) (upholding a
statute requiring debt collectors to be lawyers even though debt collection requires no legal training).
94. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 45.
95. See, e.g., NAM D. PHAM & ANIL SARDA, THE VALUE OF COSMETOLOGY
LICENSING TO THE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ECONOMY OF AMERICA 12 (2015),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52850a5ce4b068394a270176/t/54ca482ee
4b04bc79092e6da/1422542894461/PBA+Report+-+February+2015.pdf.
96. But see St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 225–27 (5th Cir.
2013) (rejecting the consumer protection argument); WHITE HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 17, at 58 (collecting studies showing that licensure has limited effects on quality).
97. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL
REGULATION
5–8
(1990),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/costs-benefits-occupational-regulation/cox_foster_-_
occupational_licensing.pdf (describing the asymmetry problem).
98. Id. at 6 (suggesting that firms may let the quality of their services
deteriorate if consumers lack the ability to discern quality).
99. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732–33 (1963).
100. Id. The Court was aware of this argument because the appellee made
it in his brief. See Brief for Appellee at 14, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
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as the Court posited a hypothetical benefit to legal knowledge
in the debt adjuster case, so also can courts find hypothetical
value in the education requirements imposed by many licensing
101
laws. And if that is true, then such licensing laws must pass
rational basis muster.
In conclusion, a weak anti-economic protectionism principle, if widely adopted, would not serve as vehicle for occupational licensing reform. Laws survive rational basis review
whenever a court can find that such law serves any public
102
health, safety, or welfare rationale. With most licensing laws,
this low standard will be met easily. In other cases, this Section
shows that judges have a whole menu of fallback options, including recognizing reliance interests, added value, or consumer protection—none of which are subject courtroom fact103
finding. This means that for an anti-economic protectionism
principle to have teeth, it must trigger rational basis with bite.
B. A STRONG ANTI-ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM PRINCIPLE:
APPLYING RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE
A strong anti-economic protectionism principle would work
similarly to the Supreme Court’s rational basis with bite cases.
In fact, one might think of economic protectionism as “economic
104
animus.” To recap, the Supreme Court’s rational basis with
bite standard involves two steps. First the Court applies the
factors from Arlington Heights to determine whether (economic) animus was the primary motivation for the challenged legislation. Second, the Court removes the cloak of presumed constitutionality that normally accompanies rational basis challenges
105
and instead searches for a legitimate purpose for the law.

(1963) (No. 111), 1963 WL 106151 at *14 (arguing that the practice of law is
unrelated to debt collection).
101. For example, a hair braider who attends cosmetology school may have
increased knowledge of sanitation procedures.
102. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
103. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (stating that
there is no courtroom fact-finding of legislative purpose).
104. To the author’s knowledge, Judge O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit
was the first judge to use this phrase as a substitute for economic protectionism. See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).
105. See Carpenter, supra note 56, at 246–48 (describing the Supreme
Court’s animus methodology).
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Thus far, the Court has not upheld any challenges at the se106
cond step.
This Section argues that the Supreme Court cases establishing rational basis with bite review for laws motivated by
animus do not justify applying that same standard to those motivated by economic protectionism. In short, traditional animus
cases bear two characteristics that justify heightened review:
the targeting of a distinct and disfavored social group and a
107
break down in the democratic process. Because laws motivated by economic protectionism, like occupational licensing, do
not bear those same traits, heightened judicial scrutiny is not
justified under Supreme Court precedent.
1. Lack of Present or Historical Societal Antipathy and
Economic Protectionism as Business as Usual
The Supreme Court’s rational basis with bite cases involve
the invalidation of legislation motivated by a bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular minority. The idea that government may not single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment traces its origins to the anti-caste beginnings of the Four108
teenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause commands
109
that state actors must treat each citizen with equal regard.
And if “equal protection of the laws means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate gov110
ernmental interest.” Although the Supreme Court has not
been clear about when or why rational basis with bite review
applies, two principles are present in each case.
First, each of the cases involved discrete social groups that
suffered from present or historical social disapproval. Although
106. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
107. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
108. See Carpenter, supra note 56, at 229–32; see also Susannah W.
Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s animus cases and caste-based legislation). For a
thorough treatment of the history of the Equal Protection Clause’s anti-caste
origins, see Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and SameSex Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016) (concluding that an original
understanding of the anti-caste mandate of the Equal Protection Clause justifies the invalidation of same-sex marriage bans).
109. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The Equal
Protection Clause does, however, require the state to treat each person with
equal regard, as having equal worth, regardless of his or her status.”).
110. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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none of the rational basis with bite cases involve formally recognized suspect classifications, all four of the injured plaintiffs
were members of groups suffering from longstanding or existing social stigma. In Moreno, for instance, the congressional
record explicitly stated that keeping “hippies or hippy com111
munes” off of food stamps was an aim of the legislation. The
facts of Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor drive this point home.
Society long stigmatized both homosexuals and cognitively dis112
abled persons. Even though the Court did not explicitly rely
on quasi-suspect group status as an explicit factor for triggering rational basis with bite, each case nevertheless involved
such a group.
Second, the rational basis with bite cases involved judicial
prevention of state actors turning disfavored social group
membership—i.e., cognitive disability, homosexuality, member
113
of a hippy community—into “systemic social disadvantage.”
Each case involved an attempt to systematically disadvantage
those groups. Moreno involved a denial of food stamps benefits
114
to hippies in need. Cleburne concerned the denial of a zoning
115
Romer and
permit that would not have impeded others.
Windsor restored legal benefits and protections to homosexu116
als. These cases show that once the government decides to
provide legal protections or benefits, it cannot deny them to
117
groups of disfavored citizens purely out of dislike.
Economic protectionism, if treated as a form of unconstitutional animus, would depart from both these principles. With
some exceptions, occupational licensing laws do not target any

111. Id. at 543.
112. See Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314–15 (D.
Conn. 2012) (providing a thorough analysis of materials supporting the
longstanding societal discrimination against homosexuals); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 419–
25 (2000) (summarizing the findings of fact contained within the Americans
with Disabilities Act, which detail longstanding societal prejudices against the
cognitively disabled).
113. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court animus cases).
114. See cases cited supra note 47.
115. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
116. See supra notes 53, 55–56.
117. Cf. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997) (“Generally speaking, laws
that apply evenhandedly to all ‘unquestionably comply’ with the Equal Protection Clause.” (quoting N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587
(1979))).
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118

particular group.
To be sure, the effects of licensing restrictions often fall most heavily on low-income entrepre119
neurs. Yet in no way do these individuals form a distinct social group. The Supreme Court once described wealth discrimination as involving “a large, diverse, and amorphous class . . .
120
[bearing] none of the traditional indicia of suspectness.”
Licensing laws also differ from traditional rational basis
with bite cases because they are evenhanded regulations. Anyone may join a profession, provided that they fulfill the re121
quirements. More crucially, each of the rational basis with
bite cases involved the denial of a government benefit or legal
protection that the state actor provided broadly—i.e., food
stamps, municipal zoning rules, discrimination protections,
122
recognition of state marriages for federal benefits. In contrast, states do not provide occupational licenses as a matter of
entitlement; they set out generally applicable requirements for
entering a profession. And a lack of unequal treatment weighs
against applying rational basis with bite to evenhanded but
123
unjust occupational licensing laws.
2. Laws Passed out of Economic Protectionism Are Subject to
Political Correction in Ways Laws Passed out of Animus Are
Not.
Licensing laws motivated by economic protectionism are
subject to democratic reform in ways that laws motivated by
124
animus are not. At the outset, it is worth noting that occupa118. So far no court dealing with an occupational licensing challenge has
entertained the possibility that licensing laws “target” any particular, identifiable group. See cases cited supra note 12.
119. See generally DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING (2012), https://
www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/occupational_licensing/
licensetowork.pdf (studying common occupational licensing laws that affect
low-income workers).
120. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
121. Again, licensing challenges do not rely on claims that state officials
are treating prospective professionals unequally. See supra note 12 (collecting
cases).
122. See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text (describing the rational
basis with bite cases).
123. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997); see also Pers. Adm’r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271–72 (1979) (“Most laws classify, and many
affect certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described by the law.”).
124. The Carolene Products framework relies in part on the assumption
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tional licensing laws are difficult to reform through the political
125
process. The analysis in this Subsection is comparative and
seeks to establish that laws motivated by economic protectionism are more likely to be reformed politically than those laws
passed out of animus, making judicial intervention in the economic sphere less justified.
The primary distinction between laws passed out of economic protectionism and those passed out of animus is the party bearing the costs of state action. In the rational basis with
bite cases, the group suffering from government mistreatment
internalized the effects of mistreatment. Whether it was going
without food stamps or being denied anti-discrimination protections, the plaintiffs in those cases bore the brunt of the harm.
The same is not true of licensing laws motivated by protectionism.
Excessive licensing regimes function differently. Just like
the animus cases, the parties injured by economic protectionism who cannot practice their profession are most acutely injured. Unlike the animus cases, however, excessive barriers to
entry create artificially inflated prices, and those dead-weight
126
losses are passed on to the consumers. For any one licensing
law, the amount by which prices are inflated is too small for
consumers to notice. This naturally leads to rational ignorance—i.e., the problem is too small for citizens to care about
127
fixing it—which then hampers reform efforts. In the aggre-

that judicial intervention is most justified when a law harming a minority
group will not be subject to democratic reform. United States v. Carolene Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75–77, 151–53
(1980) (building the Carolene Products footnote four into a theory of judicial
review).
125. See Alexandra L. Klein, The Freedom To Pursue a Common Calling:
Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing Statutes, 73 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 411, 435–38 (2016) (claiming that the individuals harmed by
licensing laws are politically powerless); Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065 (2013)
(same).
126. Kleiner, supra note 23 (estimating the amount of deadweight losses
passed on to consumers by occupational licensing laws).
127. Because the negative effects of any particular license only have a
small impact on consumers, citizens are “rationally ignorant” about this form
of overregulation. Cf. Ilya Somin, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE,
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gate, however, licensing laws increase the price of goods and
services between three and sixteen percent, amounting to an
overall $ 200 billion yearly transfer from consumers to licensed
128
workers. To put that figure in perspective, for the fiscal year
2015 the federal government spent $ 102 billion on education
129
and $ 85 billion on transportation. This is not to say that occupational licensing laws are as salient an issue as federal education spending, but rather that hundreds of billions of dollars
per year is a sufficient amount over which to fight. Based on
their aggregate effects, licensing laws have the potential to
reach a level of political salience that laws motivated by ani130
mus cannot normally achieve.
Economic protectionism is also more susceptible to political
reform in a second way: lawmakers enacting licensing requirements are acting out of rational self-interest rather than irrational prejudice. Indeed, public choice theory predicts the very
131
existence of overly restrictive licensing laws. Professionals
form associations, pool resources, and lobby their local legisla132
tors. For the legislator, it is a good deal. They create barriers
to entry that help the association—receiving, of course, political
support—while the costs passed onto consumers are too small
133
to be noticed. It is predictable and rational for politicians to
134
support these laws, provided their efforts go unnoticed. Although the same conditions that lead to overregulation make
deregulation difficult, the fact that legislators act out of rational self-interest suggests that they may be convinced to change
their minds, assuming, of course, that the political winds shift.
CATO UNBOUND (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/10/11/ilya
-somin/democracy-political-ignorance (discussing rational ignorance).
128. See Kleiner, supra note 23.
129. Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go, NAT’L PRIORITIES PROJECT, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/
spending (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
130. One might point to the gay rights movement as undercutting this
point, but twenty years of advocacy never led to the legislative repeal of
DOMA.
131. See generally Brief of Professor Todd J. Zywicki as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d
281 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1381), 2014 WL 4795938 (providing background on
public choice economics and arguing that occupational licensing is a classic
example of rent-seeking behavior).
132. Id.; see also McMichael, supra note 88 (describing how this process
enables doctors to change the functions performed by nurse practitioners).
133. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 14.
134. See supra note 127.
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There is some empirical evidence that increased public aware135
ness of an issue may dampen the effects of lobbying efforts. If
that is correct, then the longer occupational licensing reform
remains an issue of national significance, the better chance
that reform efforts will succeed in the future. And the desirability of a solution through the political process weighs against
aggressive judicial review.
In the traditional rational basis with bite cases, lawmakers, acting out of animus, were not driven by the same rational
self-interest that leads to economic protectionism, but instead
by prejudice towards the cognitively disabled, homosexuals,
and even hippies. Indeed, it is the very type of animosity giving
136
rise to “the classification [that] blocks any self-correction.”
This is either because legislators “do not see a problem in the
classification, or perhaps regard its animus-based vices as vir137
tues.” In a comparative sense, the difference between needing
to convince legislators to reverse course and act in the general
public interest should be easier than asking them to treat a his138
torically or currently disfavored group with equal regard. The
litigants in the animus cases fought uphill against irrational
135. See Nathan Grasse & Brianne Heidbreder, The Influence of Lobbying
Activity in State Legislatures: Evidence from Wisconsin, 36 LEG. STUDIES Q.
567, 579 (2011) (finding that the increased salience of an issue decreases the
effectiveness of lobbying efforts). Partisan support in Congress and increased
media attention have already led to increased political salience. See, e.g., Editorial: A License To Braid Hair? Come On, DES MOINES REG. (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2016/01/19/
editorial-license-braid-hair-come/78901608; Roll Back Regulation, Break Barriers to Economic Mobility, PIONEER PRESS (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www
.twincities.com/2016/01/04/roll-back-regulation-break-barriers-to-economic
-mobility; Cass R. Sunstein, Business as Usual in D.C.? Not in the Age of Low
Growth, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.bloombergview.com/
articles/2016-01-27/business-as-usual-in-d-c-not-in-the-age-of-low-growth;
Josh Zumbrun, Occupational Licenses May Be Bad for the Economy, But Good
for Workers Who Have Them, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/
economics/2016/04/18/occupational-licenses-may-be-bad-for-the-economy-but
-good-for-workers-who-have-them; see also Hillary Clinton Will Make Life Easier for Small Business at Every Step of the Way, HILLARY FOR AM., https://
www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2016/08/23/hillary-clinton-will
-make-life-easier-for-small-business-at-every-step-of-the-way (last visited Mar.
17, 2017) (discussing occupational licensing reform as part of Hillary Clinton’s
campaign agenda).
136. Carpenter, supra note 56, at 222.
137. Id.
138. The White House Report on licensing reform lays out many reasons
why it is in the public interest to reform such laws. See generally WHITE
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17.
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prejudice and perhaps that justifies heightened judicial intervention.
III. WHY COURTS SHOULD NOT EXTEND HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY TO LAWS MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM
If Supreme Court precedent does not justify striking down
occupational licensing laws under the rational basis with bite
standard, then this Part goes a step further, arguing that
courts should not extend heightened judicial review to include
occupational licensing laws motivated by economic protectionism. It does so by proceeding in three Sections. The first Section
explains that courts should not adopt an aggressive antieconomic protectionism principle based on the degree of difficulty in detecting such a purpose. As past cases comprising the
circuit split on this issue demonstrate, judges do not have a reliable set of factors available for detecting such a motivation.
They have instead relied on a lack of fit between licensing requirements and the public regarding values they purport to
139
serve. This is a trend likely to continue into the future as other indicia of legislative intent are either unavailable or unreliable in occupational licensing cases. The second Section follows a
strong anti-economic protectionism principle to its logical conclusion, pointing out that much contemporary legislation and
regulation would come under heightened judicial scrutiny, were
courts to take such a principle seriously. Finally, the third Section suggests that aggressively policing economic protectionism
under the Fourteenth Amendment is at least partially unnecessary as plaintiffs have other legal claims available. Indeed, rejecting heightened judicial review carries the benefit of directing occupational licensing challenges towards those other
claims that have often been ignored as interest groups push an
140
economic liberties agenda in federal court. This Part will unpack these arguments against extending heightened review to
laws motivated by economic protectionism in turn.

139. See infra Part III.A.
140. See infra Part III.C.
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A. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCY AND ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM
Federal courts lack the institutional competency to adopt a
strong anti-economic protectionism principle, or at least one
that could be consistently applied with some measure of predictability. Under traditional Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, courts use factors related to the legislative process for
141
ferreting out illegitimate purposes. Building on those cases,
scholars have called for using those same factors to detect eco142
nomic protectionism. This Section works through several of
these possibilities, explaining why they are not reliable indicators of economic protectionism.
The unreliability of traditional purpose scrutiny factors in
economic protectionism cases causes another problem—one
that has already arisen in several occupational licensing cases.
Left without other indicia of economic protectionism, courts
must fall back on means-ends scrutiny as a way of detecting
143
illegitimate motivation. This blending of purpose and meansend scrutiny always carries an unintended consequence of implicitly applying intermediate scrutiny to occupational licensing
challenges. This Section first attacks several possible indicators
of economic protectionism as either unreliable or unavailable
and then explains why detecting purpose through means-end
analysis necessarily leads to intermediate scrutiny.
Traditional indicia of legislative purpose, set forth by the
Supreme Court in Arlington Heights, are largely ineffective
144
when searching for economic protectionism. The courts of appeal that struck down occupational licensing laws did not rely
on legislative history—the most natural source of legislative
intent—in ascribing protectionist motives to the challenged
145
regulations. This trend of determining intent without legislative history will likely continue into the future. States do not
produce the same volume of legislative history as their federal

141. See supra notes 63–65.
142. See Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 79, at 1098 (laying out the factors).
143. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223–27 (5th Cir. 2013);
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 990–92 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v.
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225–29 (6th Cir. 2002).
144. See supra notes 60–62.
145. See generally St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d 215; Merrifield, 547 F.3d 978;
Craigmiles, 312 F.3d 220.
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146

counterparts. And even where such history exists, it is unlikely that representatives will publically document a desire to
push legislation out of economic protectionism. For legislative
history to be useful in economic protectionism cases, legislators
will need to fail, as Justice Scalia put it, “the stupid staffer
147
test.”
Judges Douglas H. Ginsburg and Steven Menashi have
suggested that courts might use two other Arlington Heights
factors for detecting economic protectionism, such as “the evolution of the legislation through a series of amendments, and
148
the structure of the resulting law.” To be sure, these factors
work well when a profession seeks to expand the range of activities covered by its licensing law as a means of restricting competition, i.e., funeral home directors seeking an amendment to
their governing licensing to prevent others from selling funeral
149
merchandise. When a legislature amends licensing requirements with the clear effect of restricting competition for the
benefit of a group but providing no special value it smacks of
protectionism. Those same expansive amendments also result
in a legislative structure that indicates bad intent. When a law
effectively combines two professions, the party squeezed out of
business will often be able to show how the new licensing requirements demand more training than is required for their
profession. For example, those selling funeral merchandise
could point out all of the funeral home director educational requirements that do not concern selling goods.
Although the structure of legislation and the existence of
amendments may reveal economic protectionism in some cases,
these factors are ultimately of limited import. In cases where
one profession uses legislation to squeeze out another, they will
150
be helpful. Yet there are thousands of occupational licensing

146. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common
Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995)
(“Yet another crucial distinction between state courts and federal courts interpreting statutes is the quantity of the legislative history that is available.”).
147. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025–26 n.12 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that if “the test . . . is whether the legislature
has recited a harm-preventing justification for its action,” then “this amounts
to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff ”).
148. Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 79, at 1098.
149. See, e.g., Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222 (using an amendment to a definition of a profession as evidence of economic protectionism).
150. Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 79, at 1098.
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laws nationwide, and many of them likely do not result from
heavy-handed amendments. When an occupational licensing
law serves only as a general barrier to entry and not as a direct
means of attacking competition, the amendment and structural
factors do not carry any weight. In such cases, amendments do
not carry the same weight or do not exist, and the structural
argument looks more like traditional means-ends scrutiny because rather than comparing two professions, the analysis
would center on the burdens imposed by licensing requirement
relative to the public interest served.
Moving beyond factors related to the legislative process,
courts may instead look to whether the burdens imposed by a
licensing law can be justified in light of the public interests
served by such regulations. In other words: is the cost to economic liberty at least rationally related to the benefits enjoyed
by the greater public? The problem with this approach, however, is that it necessarily demands at least rough quantification
of the benefits and burdens imposed by licensing laws, which is
not easily accomplished.
For starters, defining the public-regarding values that
might justify occupational licensing laws is difficult. Courts
could opt for a narrow definition which might only include values like increased quality of service or a reduction in safety
151
problems. These are not the only possibilities given that restrictive licensing laws could lead to increased financial investment by businesses or increased policing of consumer com152
plaints by licensing boards. Economic liberty proponents are
unlikely to be satisfied by any definition that includes consumer complaints or financial investments as there are other, more
direct means of achieving those benefits through consumer pro153
tection statutes or tax relief.
Even if courts could agree on the proper range of public
values that licensing laws could legitimately serve, then there
would still be an unresolved empirical question about how
much particular professions serve such values. Answering this
151. See ADAM B. SUMMERS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: RANKING THE
STATES AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES 36 (2007), http://reason.org/files/
762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b.pdf; see also St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,
712 F.3d 215, 223–25 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting consumer protection as a valid
justification for licensing a profession where other consumer protection statutes exist).
152. Kleiner, supra note 23, at 4.
153. See SUMMERS, supra note 151, at 36–37.
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question proves elusive. Consider two commonly licensed professions, dentists and teachers, for which most people could
raise non-protectionist based reasons for licensing. Even for
these professions, empirical studies about the effects of licensure on performance are a mixed bag with some showing that
higher requirements do not lead to improved student or patient
154
outcomes. If not even teachers and dentists can back up their
licensing requirements with strong empirical data, then it’s
likely that most others cannot either.
Compared with determining the public value served by a
particular license, the burdens imposed by licensing requirements can be more easily measured. Occupational licensing
statutes often require some combination of easily quantifiable
155
factors like schooling, exams, and fees. The trouble comes
from how one defines burdensome. For instance, doctors must
undergo extensive training but receive substantial compensation. In an absolute sense, licensing requirements for that profession are burdensome but perhaps justified based on financial
incentives. Ultimately, the relative burden of licensing requirements turns not only on the requirements imposed but
also on the value provided to the public and to the licensed party. As previously discussed, the problem ultimately rests on the
difficulty in determining which values properly serve the public
and how such values should be measured. Without solving the
public-regarding values problem, describing a licensing regime
in terms of burdens imposed is not helpful.
One way of avoiding the difficulties associated with quantifying the benefits and burdens of occupational licensing regimes is to use a comparative approach that considers the requirements of a challenged profession in comparison with the
requirements of other similar professions within that state or
the requirements imposed on the same profession in another
156
state. The problem with comparative analysis arises from the
substantial variation in how states license the same profes157
sions. For instance, the amount of education required to be154. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 58 (collecting studies).
155. CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 119, at 13 (providing a summary of
farm laborer contract licensing requirements).
156. This type of proportionality analysis in constitutional cases is popular
in Europe. See generally G. Brinton Lucas, Structural Exceptionalism and
Comparative Constitutional Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 1965 (2010) (describing constitutional analysis based on proportionality principles).
157. See, e.g., Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 79, at 1098.
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come an EMT varies from zero to over 140 days, with twenty
158
unique variations in between. To provide another example,
preschool teachers must undergo between 365 and 1825 days of
159
training, with four distinct variations between. The Institute
for Justice’s License To Work study reveals similar variations
160
among most licensed professions. As a result, comparing professional requirements across state lines does not provide an
objective basis for separating the degrees of licensing burden
imposed by various statutory schemes. In many instances,
courts would just be replacing a standardless inquiry into burdens with a standardless comparison between different state
licensing regimes. To avoid this subjectivity, courts would need
to compare a particular licensing regime to the state with the
least restrictive licensing regime. But such an analysis would
transform an anti-economic protectionism principle into a constitutional mandate for uniform licensing requirements. That
cannot be right.
These differences across state lines extend beyond how professions are licensed to which professions are licensed, and thus
courts cannot use the number of states licensing a profession as
a strong indicator of protectionism. There are 1100 licensed occupations nationwide, but only sixty professions require licen161
sure in every state. According to a White House report filed in
the summer of 2016, the variation in professions licensed is a
matter of state policy and not a matter of professions existing
162
in some states rather than others. Looking to the data provided by the License To Work report reveals the scattershot nature of occupational licensing requirements. The data from that
study shows no correlation between the requirements for licensure and the number of states licensing any particular profes163
sion. In other words, the professions with the most training
158. Emergency Medical Technician, INST. FOR JUST. (Apr. 24, 2012), http://
ij.org/report/license-to-work/ltw-occupation/?id=26.
159. Preschool Teachers, INST. FOR JUST. (Apr. 24, 2012), http://ij.org/
report/license-to-work/ltw-occupation/?id=69.
160. See generally CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 119.
161. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
162. See id.
163. This observation is based on a linear regression of the data provided
on the Institute for Justice website. Such a regression procures a correlation
coefficient of less than 0.10. Other regressions similarly reveal no correlation
between frequency of licensure and licensing requirements. See Table 4:
Breadth and Burden of Licensure: Occupations Ranked by Number and Average Burden of Licensed States Combined, INST. FOR JUST. (Apr. 2012), http://ij
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required, which should, in theory, provide the most public benefit, are not more likely to be licensed in a higher number of
states.
Left without a solid empirical basis for making determinations about benefits and burdens of licensing requirements or
without traditional indicia of legislative intent, courts are left
in the position of using means-ends analysis for finding economic protectionism—an approach silently used by the Fifth,
164
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.
Otherwise stated, courts might look at how well a legislature tailored a licensing regime in pursuit of a public health,
safety, and welfare goal. Under such an approach, poorly tailored requirements would serve as an indicator of economic
protectionism, but this also leads to unintended consequences.
Collapsing purpose scrutiny with a means-end determination, if widely adopted, would result in elevating occupational
165
licensing challenges to heightened judicial scrutiny. This implicit jump to intermediate scrutiny follows logically. Suppose
that courts were to presume economic protectionism motivates
laws that fail a means-ends standard equal to or less demand166
ing than traditional rational basis review. Under those circumstances, an anti-economic protectionism principle does not
guard economic liberties any more than current constitutional
law. For such a principle to provide protection against overly
restrictive licensing laws, the means-ends inquiry used to
smoke out economic protectionism must be greater than the
rational basis standard, which necessarily implies a level of
167
heightened judicial scrutiny.

.org/report/license-to-work/tables/table-4-breadth-and-burden-of-licensure
-occupations-ranked-by-number-and-average-burden-of-licensed-states
-combined.
164. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223–28 (5th Cir. 2013);
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 990–92 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v.
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225–29 (6th Cir. 2002).
165. This would be the preferred result of some commentators. See, e.g.,
Will Clark, Comment, Intermediate Scrutiny as a Solution to Economic Protectionism in Occupational Licensing, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 345 (2016); Harfoush,
supra note 79 (arguing against protectionist occupational licensing); Klein,
supra note 125 (same); Sandefur, supra note 79 (arguing for heightened protection of economic liberties).
166. The past circuit court cases relied almost exclusively on a lack of
means-ends fit. See St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 223–28; Merrifield, 547 F.3d
at 990–92; Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225–29.
167. This assumes that courts do not have other tools besides means-ends
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As it stands, courts lack the tools to determine when a legislature passes occupational licensing requirements based primarily on economic protectionism. The unavailability of traditional purpose scrutiny tools and the implicit jump to heightened scrutiny that comes with a search for economic protectionism should give courts pause before adopting such a principle.
The idea that a legislative act should be subject to presumptively heightened judicial review under the Fourteenth
Amendment without a showing of improper purpose would be
foreign to constitutional law and would create a bizarre world
in which economic liberties would receive automatic heightened
review while those alleging as-applied race or sex discrimina168
tion would need to first show bad legislative intent.
B. A SERIOUS ANTI-ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM PRINCIPLE
CALLS INTO DOUBT MUCH STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION
Enforcing a strong anti-economic protectionism principle
would call into question much government legislation and regulation. Such a theory would rest on the idea that a state actor
denies citizens equal protection of the law when it creates classifications based only on a desire to help a favored interest
169
group and nothing more. Proponents of heightened judicial
scrutiny suggest that courts should police this illicit motivation
based on Carolene Products grounds as well, arguing that public choice theory supports the futility of remedying protectionist
170
legislation through the political process. Yet the same public
choice principles that would support judicial review of licensing
laws cannot be cabined to only those types of regulation. If
heightened judicial review is really about bad motivation, then
any regulation based on economic protectionism should be vulnerable—and that includes a lot of state action.

scrutiny to use when ferreting out economic protectionism. See supra Part
III.A.
168. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (holding that
as-applied race discrimination requires a showing of discriminatory purpose).
169. As the Court in Craigmiles stated: “[W]e invalidate only the General
Assembly’s naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents
that funeral directors extract from consumers.” 312 F.3d at 229.
170. Neil Katsuyama, The Economics of Occupational Licensing: Applying
Antitrust Economics To Distinguish Between Beneficial and Anticompetitive
Professional Licenses, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 565, 565 (2010) (describing
political process failure that entrenches licensing laws); see also Raynor, supra
note 125, at 1085–86 (same).

1734

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1703

To see why an economic protectionism principle would call
into question much of modern state action, one needs only to
look to the prevalence of lobbying in American society. Lobby171
ing is a three or four billion dollar-per-year industry. Corporations and trade associations represent more than eighty-five
172
percent of those expenditures. Studies have shown lobbying
can be successful, notably in areas like corporate taxes, telecommunications prices, trade association entry barriers, and
173
many others. Assuming that firms advocate in their own selfinterest and the public choice theory is correct, then there is
simply a lot of economic protectionism at play in government
today. Judge Posner once observed that “much governmental
action is protectionist or anticompetitive” and that the Constitution “does not outlaw the characteristic operations of democratic (perhaps of any) government, operations which are per174
meated by pressure from special interests.” So where is the
limiting principle?
The most natural stopping point for an anti-economic protectionism principle would be occupational licensing. Advocates
of heightened judicial review might suggest that one’s interest
in engaging in a lawful profession is more worthy of judicial
protection than harms suffered as a result of economic protectionism. True enough, citizens undoubtedly have a greater interest in pursuing their lawful occupation than they do in
avoiding artificially high telecommunications rates or paying
175
the costs associated with trade association rent-seeking. But
it is hard to see why that should matter. If an anti-economic
protectionism principle is worried about legislative process,
then it is only relevant that a legislature failed to consider the
176
public good and acted instead to protect a faction. But policing all economic legislation and regulation for protectionist intent is surely not an endeavor that courts wish to undertake.

171. John M. Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying, 2014 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 178 (2014).
172. Id. at 165.
173. Id. at 168.
174. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir.
1988).
175. See infra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
176. Carpenter, supra note 56, at 231 (describing the rational basis with
bite doctrine as “not concerned as much with the legislature’s substantive conclusion . . . as it is with the kinds of considerations (desire to harm the disadvantaged group) that materially influenced the outcome”).
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On the other hand, if courts are not really worried about intent,
then this ongoing conversation about economic protectionism
should be about the appropriate standard of review for occupational licensing laws.
The problems with an anti-economic protectionism principle raised by these last two Sections also suggests another underlying difficulty: the push for heightened judicial review of
economic protectionism is a stalking horse for reviving the protections afforded to economic liberties by the Supreme Court
177
during the Lochner era. The lack of purpose scrutiny tools
available to detect protectionism leaves courts to use meansends analysis. This type of analysis strongly resembles Lochner
itself where the Supreme Court used inconsistencies in the
challenged legislation to determine that the public health justi178
fications offered by New York were only pretext. What is
more, if courts are not willing to extend an anti-economic protectionism principle to all legislation primarily motivated by
special interests, then in a sense they will have fashioned a
constitutional doctrine affording heightened scrutiny to a subset of economic liberty claims that would have been protected
179
during the Lochner era. There are compelling arguments in
favor of ending the distinction between personal and economic
liberties, but courts should face that issue head-on, rather than
smuggling it under the guise of an anti-economic protectionism
180
principle.
C. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW ROUTES CHALLENGES INTO OTHER
EXISTING DOCTRINAL AREAS
There is an often overlooked benefit of denying a Fourteenth Amendment solution to occupational licensing challenges. By denying constitutional relief, courts provide a switching

177. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
178. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–64 (1905), abrogated by W.
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
179. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 626 (1887) (“[L]egislatures
cannot, under the guise or pretext of a police regulation . . . strike down innocent occupations and invade private property . . . .”).
180. There are legitimate and compelling originalist arguments in favor of
applying heightened judicial review to occupational licensing challenges and to
other efforts by state actors to impinge upon economic liberties. See generally
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 527, 580–600 (2015) (providing a summary of originalist arguments in
favor of Lochner).
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function by pushing public interest groups into bringing challenges under alternative legal doctrines or in other courts.
Among those other options, bringing suit under state constitutional and administrative law or under the federal antitrust
statutes are the most promising. As long as the federal judiciary continues to invalidate licensing laws on a semi-regular
basis, interest groups will continue to expend resources attempting to vindicate economic liberties under the Fourteenth
Amendment—stunting the development of these alternative
jurisprudential solutions. The goal of this Section is to briefly
sketch several alternative paths to attacking overly restrictive
licensing laws. Litigants should not believe that their only
remedy lies in the Fourteenth Amendment; judges should not
decide rational basis review cases as though they are the litigant’s last hope.
1. State Constitutional Law
State constitutional law can be used to strike down occupational licensing laws. Although the United States Constitution
provides a floor in terms of individual liberties, states are free
181
to provide their citizens additional protections. This has been
especially true for economic liberties. Over seventy years have
passed since the Supreme Court last struck down a piece of
182
economic legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Meanwhile, state courts have done so over three hundred
183
times, in over thirty different states. Not only are state courts
181. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival
of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
535, 548 (1986) (“As is well known, federal preservation of civil liberties is a
minimum, which the states may surpass so long as there is no clash with federal law.”).
182. See Phillips, supra note 16 (stating that the Supreme Court abandoned economic substantive due process in 1937).
183. See Anthony B. Sanders, The “New Judicial Federalism” Before Its
Time: A Comprehensive Review of Economic Substantive Due Process Under
State Constitutional Law Since 1940 and the Reasons for Its Recent Decline, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 457, 512–39 (2005) (identifying the many instances that state
courts have employed due process to strike down regulations but also noting
the judicial retreat from substantive due process after Roe v. Wade); see also
State v. Lupo, 984 So. 2d 395 (Ala. 2007) (striking down occupational licensing
requirements for interior designers); Red River Constr. Co. v. City of Norman,
624 P.2d 1064 (Okla. 1981) (striking down a regulation on truck specifications
when they carry sand on a particular route); Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing &
Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015) (striking down state regulations requiring eyebrow threaders to be licensed cosmetologists).
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open to these challenges, they are also much better suited to
184
handle them. State courts can look to the licensing environment of their particular jurisdiction, gauge the openness of the
political process to reform, and craft an appropriate standard of
185
review. And states have recently invalidated licensing laws.
In the past decade, several state courts have employed a
more searching form of rational basis review to strike down occupational licensing laws. In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld
an Iowa statute that taxed slot machines differently based on
186
whether they were part of a casino or racetrack. On remand,
the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted the Iowa Constitution as
providing for more than a “toothless” standard of rational basis
187
Similarly in
review—ultimately invalidating the statute.
2007, the Supreme Court of Alabama struck down an interior
188
decorator licensing provision as unconstitutionally overbroad.
More recently, the Texas Supreme Court invalidated a regulation that required hair threaders to become cosmetologists, and
in doing so the Court interpreted its constitution to provide
189
heightened protection of economic liberties. Texas courts now
look to the real-world effects of statutes in determining wheth190
er there is a real rather than hypothetical rational basis. As
one scholar put it: “More than in any other field, except perhaps for review of local land use regulation, state courts in the
post-Lochner era have utilized economic substantive due pro191
cess to protect the right to make a living.” Litigants should
put that past precedent to use.

184. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional
Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 173 (2009) (“Does anyone doubt that the
Alaska Supreme Court might look at privacy issues differently from other
States or for that matter the United States Supreme Court? Or that the Montana Supreme Court might look at property rights differently from other
States or the United States Supreme Court?”).
185. Id.
186. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003).
187. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2004).
188. See Lupo, 984 So. 2d at 404.
189. Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex.
2015) (striking down state regulations requiring eyebrow threaders to be licensed cosmetologists).
190. Id. at 87.
191. Sanders, supra note 183, at 484.
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2. State Administrative Law
State administrative law is a second possibility for challenging a limited subset of excessive licensing laws. This solution is of limited reach because many licensing requirements
are statutorily defined, leaving agencies to serve only a
192
straightforward enforcement function. When state agencies
act with little discretion, there is not much regulatory activity
to challenge. Yet, when state agencies issue regulations or declaratory rulings that expand the definition of one profession to
cover another, administrative law becomes a viable option for
judicial review.
A recent example illustrates both the possibilities offered
by state administrative law and how a potential Fourteenth
Amendment solution leads to neglect of state law remedies. In
Sensational Smiles v. Mullen, teeth whiteners—represented by
the Institute for Justice—brought suit in federal court challenging a dentistry board declaratory ruling which mandated
193
that only dentists may whiten teeth. The district court dismissed the suit on summary judgment, and the Second Circuit
194
affirmed. Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act,
adopted by Connecticut, declaratory rulings by agencies must
195
be supported by “substantial evidence.” This standard is not
196
particularly high but does require some documentable proof.
The teeth whiteners’ theory of the case rested on a total lack of
evidence showing that LED lights posed a risk to public health.
Indeed, the agency’s expert testimony contained no reference to
197
the safety of such lights. Had the teeth whiteners demon192. See, e.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (2013) (describing the licensure requirement as “built on the statute’s interlocking definitions of ‘funeral establishment’ and ‘funeral directing’”).
193. Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149, 150 (D. Conn. 2014), aff ’d sub
nom. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 116 (2016).
194. Martinez, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (granting Connecticut’s summary
judgment motion); Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 288 (affirming on appeal).
195. See generally Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency of W. Haven, 628
A.2d 1286, 1292 (Conn. 1993) (discussing the substantial evidence standard).
196. Cf. Lane v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot., 43 A.3d 821, 828 (Conn. App. Ct.
2012), aff ’d, 100 A.3d 384 (Conn. 2014) (describing the substantial evidence
standard as deferential). But see AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc. v. Inland Wetlands &
Watercourses Agency of Stratford, 23 A.3d 37, 48 (Conn. Ct. App. 2011) (overturning a declaratory ruling when the agency’s determination was not supported by any evidence).
197. Reply Brief of Appellant at 3 n.1, Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen,
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strated this lack of evidence in state court, they would have
stood an excellent chance of success. Instead, the Second Cir198
cuit dismissed their appeal in several paragraphs. To be sure,
not every onerous licensing law comes into being through agency action. But when they do, administrative law provides a
powerful attack on restricting licensing requirements.
3. Federal Antitrust Law
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina
State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission
has opened up new and exciting possibilities for challenging
199
licensing board activities. The Court’s decision requires states
to actively supervise licensing boards when they are comprised
200
of market participants. At least one significant challenge has
already relied heavily on North Carolina State Board. In
Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical, plaintiffs sued the Texas Medical Board under the Sherman Act when the Board adopted a
regulation prohibiting the diagnosis of medical conditions via
201
video conference. The state of Texas did not raise antitrust
202
immunity in the case. Judge Pittman did, however, grant a
preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs based on anti203
trust law. Ultimately, the ability of antitrust law to curb
overreaching licensing boards is not yet clear, but if Teledoc is
any indication, it is off to a promising start.
None of these alternative avenues of attacking occupational licensing laws is a silver bullet. Some state constitutions protect economic liberty; others do not. State administrative and
federal antitrust laws are similarly narrow. Between these
three possibilities, however, a fair number of restrictive licensing laws could be defeated. Both the difficulties in discerning
economic protectionism and the existence of alternative solu-

793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015) (No.14-1381), 2014 WL 7335956, at *2 (“None of
this out-of-court testimony speaks at all to the issues in this case. Indeed, in
the more than 150 pages of documentation he attached to his report, there is
only a single statement about LED lights.”).
198. Cf. AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc., 23 A.3d at 48 (overturning a declaratory
ruling when the agency’s determination was not supported by any evidence).
199. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107 (2015).
200. Id. at 1116–17.
201. Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 532 (W.D. Tex.
2015).
202. Id. at 535.
203. Id. at 544.

1740

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1703

tions counsel against adopting heightened review of illegitimately motivated licensing laws. The final Part of this Note
concludes by arguing that Congress needs to spur licensing reform efforts and lays out a plan describing how it might do so.
IV. REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS
WITHOUT FEDERAL JUDICIAL INTERVENTION:
REVIVING THE INDIANA PLAN
This Note argues throughout that existing Supreme Court
precedent does not support federal courts striking down occupational licensing laws and that heightened review should not
204
be extended to reach such a result. Closing the doors to federal courts does not also foreclose the possibility of licensing
reform. Congress can encourage states to take action. This Part
proposes a grant program wherein Congress would fund state
sunset laws to study and eliminate occupational licensing requirements. First, Section A explains why federal intervention
is necessary. Second, Section B introduces two current efforts
at the national level and argues that neither will lead to significant changes. Third, Section C concludes by describing a grant
program that would promote sunset commissions while leaving
plenty of discretion to state governments.
A. WHY FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IS NEEDED TO SOLVE THE
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING PROBLEM
Congress should promote occupational reform not because
federal intervention into state economic policy is desirable, but
because it is the best of competing alternatives. States have
205
had little success in solving this problem on their own; inter206
state travel has not spurred a race to the top. Nor is it desirable to charge judges with conducting the case-by-case cost207
benefit analysis required. A grant program that promotes re-

204. See supra Parts II, III.
205. See generally The De-Licensing of Occupations in the United States,
BUREAU LAB. STATS. (May 2015), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/the
-de-licensing-of-occupations-in-the-united-states.htm (summarizing reform
efforts at the state level) [hereinafter De-Licensing of Occupations].
206. There are two sources for this conclusion. First, licensing laws have
not been reformed. See id. Second, most states maintain a similar level of
overall licensure. See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
207. This Note previously rejected such a possibility. See supra Part III.
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form efforts, while leaving a wide berth for state innovation, is
the best of competing alternatives.
The states have created a mess of overly restrictive, incon208
sistent, and economically damaging licensing requirements.
Just as they have created the problem, state governments have
failed to lead reform efforts. Indeed, only eight professions have
209
ever had their licensing requirements removed. Over the past
five years, several efforts to enact broad reform bills have died
210
in state legislatures. States may be vulnerable to interest
group capture, and for legislation involving occupational licensing, interest groups have strong incentives to fight against re211
form. Making matters worse still, state governments collect
substantial revenue from licensing fees, and thus deregulation
212
can create short-term budget shortfalls. Whatever the main
barriers to deregulation efforts that engender bi-partisan support might be, they have thus far blocked any meaningful reforms.
Another possible solution would be to continue letting
states compete for new entrepreneurs that arrive via interstate
travel. As mentioned earlier, there is very little variation between states on practicing professions, but there is substantial
213
variation in whether states license any particular profession.
Ilya Somin points out that forty-three percent of Americans
have lived in two or more states, and that those with low in214
comes are twice as likely to move interstate. Further, economic considerations are the most likely factor to motivate in215
terstate movers. Despite an environment that appears favorable to interstate migration putting pressure on legislatures to
208. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
209. See De-Licensing of Occupations, supra note 205.
210. See id. (“[A] number of recent attempts have occurred at the state
level—nine as of 2014—to de-license collectively certain groups of occupations
. . . these attempts were unsuccessful.”).
211. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1689, 1730 (1984) (stating that state legislatures may be particularly
susceptible to capture when legislation affects wealth distribution).
212. See State Tax Collection Sources 2000–2013, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-tax-collection-sources-2000-2013 (last
visited Mar. 17, 2017) (showing that states collect substantial revenues from
occupational licensing).
213. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
214. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 144 (2013).
215. See id. at 144–45.
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deregulate, however, there is little difference in how many lowincome professions are licensed per state. According to the Institute for Justice’s License To Work study, the average state
licenses forty-three low-income professions, with a standard
216
deviation of only ten. Indeed, rather than leading to deregulation, the patchwork of licensing laws nationwide has given
rise to a substantial increase in licensure over the past fifty
217
years.
Judges—either state or federal—could be a third option for
reforming licensing laws. This could come by way of legislatures creating an occupational licensing cause of action that
218
permits courts to apply intermediate scrutiny, or it could
come via constitutional interpretation. This Note previously
argued against the latter. But any cause of action requiring
heightened scrutiny will also require both an economic estimation (how much public value) and a corresponding policy de219
termination (how much regulation is appropriate). Judges
have limited resources, clogged dockets, and most of them are
220
not labor economists. All things being equal, it seems unobjectionable that it would be better for elected or appointed officials to conduct the required cost-benefit analysis. They are not
limited to the record evidence presented by the parties and are
politically accountable for the choices they make about the level
of regulation that should be imposed.
Finally, Congress could pass an aggressive program that
federalizes occupational licensing requirements or that gives a
federal agency the power to preempt licenses on a case-by-case
basis. A law like this would easily survive a Commerce Clause
challenge based on the overall economic effects of licensing
216. See CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 119. But see WHITE HOUSE REsupra note 17, at 4 (claiming there is wide variation among the states).
217. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 3.
218. See, e.g., Allow Act, S. 3158, 114th Cong. (2016) (introducing such
legislation).
219. For instance, the Allow Act would prohibit licenses placing “a substantial burden on a person” unless “the government has an important interest”
and “the regulation is substantially related to achievement of ” that interest.
Id. § 207 (b)(1)–(2); see also Model Economic Liberty Law, INST. FOR JUST.,
http://ij.org/activism/legislation/model-legislation/model-economic-liberty-law-1
(last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
220. See generally Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain:
The Federal Courts and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473 (2009) (describing the “crushing caseloads” of the
federal courts).
PORT,
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laws and their impact on interstate migration. But states
have long managed their own licensing regimes. The Supreme
Court observed in Dent v. State of West Virginia: “[I]t has been
the practice of different States, from time immemorial, to exact
in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and learning upon
222
which the community may confidently rely. . . .” States have
always maintained their own licensing laws. Any national solution should thus respect federalism to the greatest extent possible. This counsels against aggressive federal intervention.
A grant problem avoids some of difficulties present in each
of the alternatives rejected in this Section. A federal grant program respects federalism by allowing states to decide whether
to participate and by allowing states to fashion their own reform efforts. Any such program would require cost-benefit
analysis to be conducted by democratically accountable public
officials. And finally, a grant program can be designed to counteract the political process failures at the state level that currently make reform impossible. Before turning to what such a
federal program should look like, we will turn briefly to a discussion of why existing federal reform efforts are inadequate.
B. THE CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS IN CONGRESS AND THE
WHITE HOUSE PLAN ARE BOTH INADEQUATE
There are two main proposals in place for reforming occupational licensing laws. The first is a program established by
the Obama administration that gives independent groups mon223
ey to work with state legislatures. The second is a bill proposed by Mike Lee and Ben Sasse that operates primarily by

221. If Congress can regulate homegrown marijuana for personal consumption, the intrastate killing of wolves on private property, and a cat at the Ernest Hemmingway Museum, then licensing laws affecting the national economy
by billions of dollars should be no problem. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005) (homegrown marijuana); 907 Whitehead St., Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., 701 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2012) (a cat at a museum); Gibbs v. Babbitt,
214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (intrastate wolves).
222. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
223. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, FACT SHEET:
New Steps To Reduce Unnecessary Occupation Licenses that Are Limiting
Worker Mobility and Reducing Wages (June 17, 2016), http://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/fact-sheet-new
-steps-reduce-unnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting [hereinafter White
House Fact Sheet].
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reforming licensure in the District of Columbia. Neither of
these options show much promise.
The White House program is unlikely to be effective because it targets the wrong part of occupational licensing reform. In its current form, the grant program gives funds to non225
profit organizations to work with state governments. But the
problem over the past several years is not getting licensing reform bills to legislatures; it is getting legislatures to pass
226
them. Indeed, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that collective reform bills made it to committee in nine states over the
past five years, yet each time the bill either died or was passed
227
A program dewithout removing licensing requirements.
signed to send more bills into the dysfunctional political process
seems doomed to run up against the same resistance that defeated past reform efforts in the first place.
228
Senator Mike Lee proposed the Allow Act in 2016. This
legislation would institute licensing reform measures in the
229
District of Columbia. It provides for increased state supervision of licensing board activities; creates a requirement that
cost-benefit analysis be conducted on every licensing law every
fifth year; and provides for a statutory cause of action, which
230
imposes intermediate scrutiny on licensing requirements.
Lee’s proposal is unlikely to change licensing practices nationwide. Widespread consensus about the economic benefits of deregulation and potential competition for interstate migration
231
have not led to reform. Why would reducing the licensing
burden in the District be any different?
Both of these reform efforts are unlikely to precipitate
needed changes at the state level. They both fail to account for
factors that defeated past efforts to reform licensing laws. To
make a non-trivial difference, the federal government needs to
increase its commitment to this issue. The next and final Section of this Note proposes an alternative federal grant program.
224. Allow Act, S. 3158, 114th Cong. (2016).
225. See White House Fact Sheet, supra note 223 (announcing a grant of
$7.5 million for states and organizations to work together to pursue licensing
reform efforts).
226. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
228. See S. 3158.
229. See id. § 205.
230. See id. § 206.
231. See id. § 207.
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C. LETTING THE SUN SET ON LICENSING LAWS BY TAKING THE
FAILED INDIANA PLAN NATIONAL
Congress should invest additional resources in occupational licensing reform through a more aggressive grant program
than the one currently in place. Congress should encourage
states by providing monetary incentives substantial enough to
defray the costs of setting up reform commissions and to offset
the short-term licensing fee losses. Morris Kleiner suggests
that because reform committees do not run heavy administrative costs, take-up incentives for states would not need to exceed ten million dollars. He further notes that “every dollar
spent on those incentives is likely to generate more than a dollar in new economic activity: the plan will more than pay for
232
itself.” But what should such a grant program look like?
A failed effort in Indiana provides a model. In 2013, a bi233
partisan group of senators introduced S.B. 520. The bill created an appropriately titled Eliminate, Reduce, and Streamline
Employee Regulation (ERASER) Committee to analyze occupational licensing laws. A number of low-income professional licenses in Indiana would be reviewed through cost-benefit anal234
ysis on a five-year cycle. All licensing laws would automatically expire during their designated year unless reauthorized
235
by the state legislature. The bill put licenses for auctioneers,
interior designers, and beauty culture on the chopping block; it
236
passed the senate thirty-six to thirteen. After moving to the
house of representatives, the bill died in committee—where it
237
remains buried today.
Congress should use the failed ERASER Committee as a
model for a grant program. Sunset legislation provides important benefits. First, by setting an expiration date on a par-

232. Kleiner, supra note 22, at 19.
233. ERASER Committee, S.B. 520, 118th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2013).
234. Id. §§ 9–14 (putting a number of licenses on sunset).
235. See, e.g., id. § 10 (b) (“The licenses listed in this section are terminated
July 1, 2014, unless the general assembly takes action in the 2014 legislative
session to retain the licenses.”).
236. SB 520, OPEN STATES, http://openstates.org/in/bills/2013/SB520 (last
visited Mar. 17, 2017).
237. Maureen Hayden & Scott Smith, Pence’s ‘ERASER’ Bill Appears Dead,
HERALD BULL. (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.heraldbulletin.com/news/local_news/
pence-s-eraser-bill-appears-dead/article_f4143c37-d175-5fc9-86c9
-d7e1733c0147.html.

1746

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1703

ticular law, state legislatures force themselves to actually vote
on reauthorization. By shifting the default rule from reauthorization to deregulation, politicians lose the ability to kill legisla238
tion in committee. Second, by singling out each profession for
an individual vote, sunset legislation stops interest groups from
239
joining forces to defeat broader legislation. Third, periodic
review of many licenses promotes fairness. Professions should
not be reviewed for deregulation based on the clout of their respective trade association.
To put this ERASER grant proposal into place, a federal
agency—perhaps the Department of Labor—should be charged
240
with administering the program. Any such agency should
conduct a study that recommends a set of professions that do
not need licensing laws—identifying as well those professions
241
where registration or certification would suffice. Subject to a
minimum requirement, states should be able to choose the professions to be put on sunset. States should also be able to propose the composition of their ERASER committees, subject to
242
agency approval. Finally, commissions should be required to
conduct cost-benefit analysis and make the results public. This
requirement helps reform-minded legislators argue in favor of
deregulation. But public cost-benefit analysis would also help
state and even federal courts conduct informed judicial review
243
in the future if necessary.

238. Niki Kelly, Deregulation of Engineers Draws Fire, J. GAZETTE (July
25, 2015), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/indiana/Deregulation-of
-engineers-draws-fire-7899670 (quoting a state legislator as stating “due to the
pressure from groups it’s very difficult to get anything done” and noting that
he “took heat from the cosmetologists and barbers for being involved in the
effort”).
239. States have delicensed a few professions when such efforts are undertaken individually. See De-Licensing of Occupations, supra note 205 (noting
eight professions have been deregulated).
240. The Department of Labor seems the natural choice because the White
House charged it with administering the current program. White House Fact
Sheet, supra note 223.
241. This should take some of the heat off of state legislatures when they
are picking and choosing between professions to deregulate. For more information on certification and registration, see Kleiner, supra note 22, at 22–23.
242. Indiana, for instance, proposed to use a mix of appointed officials, government actors, the Indiana University Dean of Public Affairs, and some licensed professionals. See ERASER Committee, S.B. 520, 118th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. §§ 7–8 (Ind. 2013).
243. Indeed, this fits nicely with this Note’s earlier suggestion of bringing
more licensing claims in state court. See supra Part III.C.1.
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Finally, the timing could not be more perfect for Congress
to pass meaningful legislation addressing occupational licensing reform. Both Democrats and Republicans support deregula244
tion. State governments are trying and failing to pass com245
A grant program that
prehensive deregulation measures.
promotes the Indiana model would be relatively inexpensive,
easy to manage, and would force states to confront their most
onerous licensing laws.
CONCLUSION
Occupational licensing laws enacted by state governments
at the behest of special interest groups pose a serious problem
in the United States. They are a drag on the economy. They
push workers into unemployment and deny citizens their freedom to engage in their chosen profession. Three courts of appeals have decided that economic protectionism cannot support
state action. Rather than engage with the soundness of that
determination, this Note asks a different question: If economic
protectionism is illegitimate, then what role should such a
principle play under the Fourteenth Amendment?
Under Supreme Court precedent, a finding of economic
protectionism cannot result in the invalidation of occupational
licensing laws. The rational basis standard is simply too deferential to support that result; nor is economic protectionism the
kind of bad motive, like animus, that supports heightened judicial review. This Note also argues that courts should not extend
heightened review to laws motivated by economic protectionism. Such a principle would ask too much of the judiciary, encompass too much state action, and would stunt the development of other doctrinal areas that can already provide a remedy for restrictive occupational licensing laws. To be sure, compelling arguments exist for increased judicial protection of economic liberties, but a strong anti-economic protectionism principle is both pragmatically and theoretically unsound.

244. Bi-partisan support exists at both the federal and state levels. See
Steven Greenhut, California’s Bipartisan Push Against Occupational Licensing, REASON (Feb. 22, 2016), http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/22/californias
-bipartisan-push-against-occu; Ali Meyer, Bipartisan Support Builds for Occupational Licensing Reform, WASH. FREE BEACON (Feb. 3, 2016), http://
freebeacon.com/issues/bipartisan-support-builds-for-occupational-licensing
-reform.
245. See De-Licensing of Occupations, supra note 205.
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This Note concludes that Congress is the correct branch of
government to solve the nationwide occupational licensing
problem. State governments have failed and continue to fail in
deregulation efforts. A federal grant program that encourages
the adoption of sunset commissions could spur deregulation at
the state level, while at the same time maintaining respect for
the historical role of state governments in licensing their citizens. This would also take the pressure off of the federal judiciary. Democrats and Republicans agree on the importance of
occupational licensing reform. Congress should transform that
widespread agreement into meaningful legislation that breaks
down unnecessary barriers to the American Dream.

